Which, to be fair, is also derived from a word which would be most accurately (with English vowels) pronounced as mah-nuh. Although at this point “manna” is definitively also a word of English whose correct pronunciation is with /æ/.

Second Shadow of the Colossus. The moments where you can just sit and look, coupled with the soundtrack, are some of the best in gaming history. Plus that bit of tension knowing what you’re about to get into…

Not only is tunic beautiful; the experience is amazing. It’s even better if you try to solve the main optional puzzle as you go.

Definitely agree that it’s one of the best.

Some of these depend on dialect - where my family is from, gaunt and aunt rhyme, for example.

Of course, that makes it worse, not better :P

I’m a computer scientist mainly but with a heavy focus/interest in computer architecture. My plan is to teach at a university at this point - but it seems to me like that would be a good place to create completely open standards technology from.^1Specifically because if the point isn’t to make money, there’s no reason to create walled gardens.

There’s certainly enough interest from people who want to be able to build their own systems. What would actually worry me isn’t the ability to make a new open standard or any of that. It’s that AMD64 is very hard to compete with in this space, because the processors are just faster, and there is so much x86 software that people who build PCs usually want access to.

AMD64’s performance is the result of years and years of optimizations and patenting new hardware techniques, followed by aggressively litigating people trying to compete. ARM performance is catching up but ARM prefers licensing their core IP over making their own systems, making it harder for them to break into the PC space even if they want to.

A new player would be in for a long, long time of unprofitable work just to compete with AMD64 - which most people are still happy with anyway.

^1 some others and I are actually working on some new ISA / open soft processors for it. However it is focused at an educational setting and unlikely to ever be used outside of embedded devices at most.

Neither spectre nor meltdown are specific to Intel. They may have been discovered on Intel hardware but the same attacks work against any system with branch prediction or load speculation. The security flaw is inherent to those techniques. We can mitigate them with better address space separation and address layout randomization. That is, we can prevent one process from reading another process’s data (which was possible with the original attacks), but we can’t guarantee a way to prevent malicious browser tab from reading data from a different tab (for example), even if they are both sandboxed. We also have some pretty cool ways to detect it using on-chip neural networks, which is a very fancy mitigation. Once it’s detected, a countermeasure can start screwing with the side channel to prevent leakage at a temporary performance cost.

Also, disabling hyper threading won’t cut your performance in half. If the programs that are running can keep the processor backend saturated, it wouldn’t make any noticeable difference. Most programs can only maintain about 70-80% saturation, and hyper threading fills in the gaps. However the result is that intensive, inherently parallelizable programs are actually penalized by hyper threading, which is why you occasionally see advice to disable it from people who are trying to squeeze performance out of gaming systems. For someone maintaining a server with critically sensitive data, that was probably good advice. For your home PC, which is low risk… you’re probably not worried about exposure in the first place. If you have a Linux computer you can probably even disable the default mitigations if you wanted.

I think the mitigations are acceptable, but for people who don’t want to worry about that, yes, it could put them off choosing AMD.

To reiterate what Tavis Ormandy (who found the bug) and other hardware engineers/enthusiasts say, getting these things right is very hard. Modern CPUs apply tons of tricks and techniques to go fast, and some of them are so beneficial that we accept that they lead to security risks (see Spectre and Hertzbleed for example). We can fully disable those features if needed, but the performance cost can be extreme. In this case, the cost is not so huge.

Plus, even if someone were to attack your home computer specifically, they’d have to know how to interpret the garbage data that they are reading. Sure, there might be an encryption key in there, but they’d have to know where (and when) to look*. Indeed, mitigations for attacks like spectre and hertzbleed typically include address space randomization, so that an attacker can’t know exactly where to look.

With Zenbleed, the problem is caused by something relatively simple, which amounts to a use-after-free of an internal processor resource. The recommended mitigation at the moment is to set a “chicken bit,” which makes the processor “chicken out” of the optimization that allocates that resource in the first place. I took a look at one of AMD’s manuals and I’d guess for most code, setting the chicken bit will have almost no impact. For some floating-point heavy code, it could potentially be major, but not catastrophic. I’m simplifying by ignoring the specifics but the concept is actually entirely accurate.

* If they are attacking a specific encrypted channel, they can just try every value they read, but this requires the attack to be targeted at you specifically. This is obviously more important for server maintainers than for someone buying a processor for their new gaming PC.